We show that e log log P simultaneously secure bits can be extracted from the discrete log function. These bits satisfy tbe next-bit unpredictability condition of Blum and Micali. Therefore we can construct a cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator which produces c log log P bits per modular exponentiation under the assumption that tbe discrete log is hard.
We start by defining the concept of a secure single bit with respect to an underlying function f. Definition 1 . A boolean predicate B(X) of X is hard with respect to a function f if an oracle which outputs B(X) on input f(X) can be used to invert f in polynomial time.
We now extend this notion to consider the simultaneous security of several bits. Call a boolean predicate trivial if it is identically 0 or identically 1.
Deflnltlon 2 . A k-bit predicate Bk(X) is hard with respect to a function f if for every nontrivial boolean predicate B on k bits, an oracle which outputs B (B,(X)) on input f(X) can be used to invert f in polynomial time. If B, is a hard predicate then we say that bits B,(X) of X are weak dmultaneourly Mure.
Blum and Micali showed a hard boolean predicate for the discrete log. Long and Widgerson (Long, 1983) show that c log log P high order bits of X are weak simultaneously secure. Long (Long, 1984) shows that c log log P low order bits are also weak simultaneously secure.
Weak simultaneous security, however, is not the strongest possible notion of security. In particular, weak simultaneous security of k bits is not enough to use all k bits in a cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator.
The notion of nexbbit unpredictability came up in the study of pseudo random number generators. Blum and Micali (Blum, 1982) showed the first pseudo random number generator which had this property. Yao (Ym, 1982) later showed that pseudo random number generators with this property pass all polynomial statistical tests for randomness. Below we define this notion outside the context of pseudo random number generators. In section 5 we show that nextbit unpredictability is stronger than weak simultaneous security in the sense that if k bits of X are nextbit unpredictable then they are also weak simultaneously secure.
Dedinitlon a . Let f be a function from 2, to ZN. k bits zl, * * * ,zt of X are nextblt unpredlctable if for every I (1 5 1 < k) an oracle which on input /(X),zl, ..., q outputs zi+l on -+ 6 fraction of all inputs X, can be used to invert f in probabilistic polynomial time.
(Here, 6 > (log N)-' for some constant c)
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The main result in this paper is that if P = 2sq + 1, with q an odd integer, then the k = c log log P bits immediately following the +th. least significant bit of X are nextbit unpredictable in the discrete log. Thus we can extract t log log P bits per modular exponentiation in a pseudo random number generator based on the discrete log:
Let zo be a random number in Z,. Let a be a generator for 2,. Let z, = a ' ' -' (mod P ) .
Extracting the c log log P bits immediately following the .s-th. lsb. of zL,zLL-l,...,zo, we obtain the dhcrete log pseudo random sequence. Vazirani and Vazirani (Vazirani, 1984) have recently shown that t log log P ~e c u r e bits can also be extracted from the z2 mod N generator of Blum, Blurn, and Shub, as well a5 from other encryption schemes based on factoring.
The 9 least slgniflcant blts of X are easy
In this section we show that the discrete log problem reduces to the problem or computing (mod P ) from a$ ' (mod P ) .
Pohlig Hellman (Pohlig, 1978) first gave an algorithm to compute the discrete log in the s p e cial case that P = 2' + 1. In fact, their techniques show that the S least significant bits of X can be efficiently computed from ax (mod P ) where P = 2'q + 1.
We use a slightly different method, introducing the technique of shifting X to the right by computing the square root of a x . This technique will be used throughout this paper.
Square roots modulo a prime number are computable in probabilistic polynomial time. (Rabin, 1980) A quadratic residue modulo P is of the form aZt (mod P ) . Therefore, if ax = B (rnod P ) , the least significant bit of X is 0 if and only if B is a quadratic residue. In this case the roots of @ are a * (rnod P ) and o * (mod P ) , The Erst of these
is called the prlnclpal square root of B (with respect to the generator a). Blum and Micali (Blum, 1982) have shown that if we could compute the principal square root of B then we would be able to solve the discrete log in polynomial time: If B is a nonresidue we know that the lsb. of X is 1. We can set this bit to 0 by dividing B by a. Then we divide X by 2 by computing the principal square root. Thus we have shifted X to the right, moving X's 2nd. lsb. to the Isb. position, where it can be determined by testing quadratic residuosity. We can keep shifting until we obtain all bits of X. Thus we have shown the following: (Blum-Micall) the dlserete log reducem to the prlnclpal square root problem.
We cannot in general compute the principal square root of X. Notice, however, that if B is a x + zs"( X -quadratic residue, then both roots a ' and a * of @have the same quadratic character provided S > 1 i.e. the 1sb. of the roots are equal. Choose an arbitrary root, set its Isb. to 0, and again compute a root of the result. This time there are four possible results , but provided S > 2 they all have the same quadratic character. We can in this manner compute the S least significant bits of X. The computation tree is shown below. Any path down this tree yields the correct bits.
If we can compute thew bits then we can set them to 0. Thus we have shown the following:
the discrete log reducw to solving the equation a ' ' = B (mod P ) for T. (and the oracle), the diMrete log problem then reduces to finding the principal square root of , 9 = a'r (mod P ) But this is easy since the principal quare root 7 = a'-1r (mod P ) of B is the unique root which satisfies 7 ' = 1 (mod P ) . To see this recall where T is even.
*+
that up-' = ugq = 1 (mod P ) .
Then
7 ' = a = 1 (mod P ) , whereas (-7)' 6 -1 (mod P ) since q is odd.
It will follow from Theorem 1 of the next settion tbat this result bolds even in the c s e where the oracle is correct in -+ c fraction of inputs. This result is included in (Long, 1984) dong with a proof that almost dl bits of X are hard with respect to oracles which are always 4. c log log P nexbbit unpredictable bitr Let z, be the ith. least significant bit of X.
Theorem 1 . Let k = E log log P for some constant c. Then q+,, . . . , z , +~ are next-bit unpredictable in the discrete log if we require the oracle to predict correctly on every input.
Prwl:
Suppose there exists I , 15 I < k , and an oracle 0 which on input ( P , Q ,~, Z , +~, * . . ,zS+,) outputs z,+~+~. As before, we may assume X = 2'2'. Algorithm I computes X in probabilistic polynomial time. Several operations are performed on the value of X.
These can be done in polynomial time even when the value of X is not known but ax (mod P )
is. The operations art:
-test whether X equals a particular value.
-assignment (Y := X).
-division by 2 when the S + 1 least significant bits of X are known.
-setting a particular bit of X to 0 when the value of the bit is known. Prooh Algorithm-I computes the discrete log using an oracle which is always correct. Now s u p 1 1 pose the oracle is correct on -+ f fraction of inputs, with t = -( u = O( log log P ) ).
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We will construct an oracle which is correct with probability exponentially close to 1 for all X < 7. Note that, in the iteration of the for loop in which the correct value of zs+l . . . z,+l is assumed, the oracle is queried for monotonically decreasing values of Y. Therefore, for the a l p rithm to work, we need only etsrt with an initial value of X which is less than 2y+1.
P P
Note that Algorithm-I always knows the e + 1 least significant bits of X. Therefore, if then z , + / +~ can be determined from the e + 1+1 st. bit of X + r provided P
x<2u+'
2=+1-1 0 5 r < p 2"+' , since then X + r < P. This gives us a way of randomizing queries to the oracle. To determine the a + I+ 1 st. bit of X we query the oracle on the s + I+ 1 5t. bit of X+ r for random values of r in the specified range. We now show that the probability of obtain- ing a correct answer on each such random query is 2 -+ -.
2"+1-
y + 1 -L e t S = { X + r / O < r < P 2 Y + ' }. Notice IS1 = P d , and every ele-P ment of S is less than P provided X < 2u+1. Let -+ Z be the fraction of elements in S for which the oracle is correct. Then the total number of correct answem of 0 ia less than or equal to the number of correct answers in S plus the cardinality of the complement of S. Thus
Thus the oracle is correct on -+ -fraction of all elements in the set S. Therefore, by 2 4
querying the oracle on a polynomial number (in log P) of points we obtain the 8 + I+ 1 st. l e z t significant bit of X with negligible probability of error.
A problem remains in that we have assumed that X < F . This is solved by randomizing X i.e. we try to solve the equation a(X+R)mod(P-l)= a = @aR (mod P ) for random values of R ( 0 < R < P -1). With probability 2u+L (X+ R ) mod (P-1) < -.
Alternatively, we could simply try all possible values or the u + 1st. most significant bits of X, setting these bits to 0 by dividing by the appropiate power of a. Thus our algorithm computes X in probabilistic polynomial time .~ 1 P ,
Next bit unpredictabllity implies weak simultaneous security
The next theorem shows that next bit unpredictability is a stronger notion than weak simultaneous security. Although this result is implied by a fundamental theorem of Yao, (Yao, 1982) it is included here because it has a straightforward proof.
Theorem 8 . unpredictable with respect to f then they are also weak simultaneously secure with respect t o 1. Suppose bits ( z l , . . . ,q) are next-bit unpredictable. Let B be a non-trivial predicate on Let f be a function from ZN to 2,. If k = c log log N bits are nexbbit 70 (zlr -* ,q). Let 0 be an oracle for B given f(X). Let T be the set of values of (zit . . . ,zt) for which B(zl, . . -,zk) = 1. Since B is non trivial , there exists a prefix B = u1 . . . u~ (possibly the empty string A) for which the number of elements in T with prefix Ti1 is distinct from the number of elements in T with prefix ii0. Assume, without loss of generality, that T contains more elements with prefix Ti1 than with prefix 30.
Proof:
Let 3 = (zl, . . . ,q). We make the simplifying assumption that all values of (zl, . . . , z t ) are equally probable when X is random. Then, if 3 = 8, the probability that 0 outputs z,+, on input f(X) is > -. We construct an oracle O for zl+l given ( j (~) , z~, . . . ,zi) as follows: Now we show 0 is correct on a t least -+ (log N)-' fraction of all inputs. Thus, by the Let p be the probability that 0 is correct when X is chosen at random. Then 
